Lists of species underpin many fields of human endeavour, but there are currently no universally accepted principles for deciding which biological species should be accepted when there are alternative taxonomic treatments (and, by extension, which scientific names should be applied to those species). As improvements in information technology make it easier to communicate, access, and aggregate biodiversity information, there is a need for a framework that helps taxonomists and the users of taxonomy decide which taxa and names should be used (...) by society whilst continuing to encourage taxonomic research that leads to new species discoveries, new knowledge of species relationships, and the refinement of existing species concepts. Here, we present 10 principles that can underpin such a governance framework, namely (i) the species list must be based on science and free from nontaxonomic considerations and interference, (ii) governance of the species list must aim for community support and use, (iii) all decisions about list composition must be transparent, (iv) the governance of validated lists of species is separate from the governance of the names of taxa, (v) governance of lists of accepted species must not constrain academic freedom, (vi) the set of criteria considered sufficient to recognise species boundaries may appropriately vary between different taxonomic groups but should be consistent when possible, (vii) a global list must balance conflicting needs for currency and stability by having archived versions, (viii) contributors need appropriate recognition, (ix) list content should be traceable, and (x) a global listing process needs both to encompass global diversity and to accommodate local knowledge of that diversity. We conclude by outlining issues that must be resolved if such a system of taxonomic list governance and a unified list of accepted scientific names generated are to be universally adopted. (shrink)

Background Developing confident capacity for ethical decision-making is vital in nursing education. However, no tool examines nursing students’ competence in ethical decision-making. Aim This study aimed to develop an Ethical Decision-Making Competence Scale (EDM-CS) to assess ethical care decision-making competencies in nursing students. Participants and research context Original items were obtained by employing a focus group and the Delphi method. A cross-sectional design was used to confirm the items remained on the scale. Additionally, the scale’s reliability and validity were assessed. (...) The EDM-CS was completed by 498 nursing students. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to examine the factor structure based on data from group 1 ( n = 250). A second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to examine the model’s fitness based on data from group 2 ( n = 248). This study was conducted between August 2022 and July 2023. Ethical considerations The Institutional Review Board of OO Medical University Hospital approved this study’s design and procedure. Results From the original 34 items, nine were deleted in the EFA. Thus, the EDM-CS had 25 items and a four-factor structure (ethical judgement, ethical sensitivity, ethical motivation, and ethical action), which explained 60.97% of the total variance. A second-order CFA identified a second-order factor termed ‘ethical decision-making competence’ with 18 items (root mean square residual = 0.052). The EDM-CS scores correlated significantly and positively with the scores on the Scale of Protective Factor-24 (r = 0.47, p <.001), which indicated good convergent validity. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the final EDM-CS was 0.90 and ranged from 0.73 to 0.80 for the four subscales. Discussion and conclusion The EDM-CS was validated to fit the data adequately. It can be used to evaluate clinical nursing students’ ethical decision-making abilities and to develop education strategies to improve their ethical care competence. (shrink)

The fluctuation-dissipation theorem is a central theorem in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics by which the evolution of velocity fluctuations of the Brownian particle under a fluctuating environment is intimately related to its dissipative behavior. This can be illuminated in particular by an example of Brownian motion in an ohmic environment where the dissipative effect can be accounted for by the first-order time derivative of the position. Here we explore the dynamics of the Brownian particle coupled to a supraohmic environment by considering (...) the motion of a charged particle interacting with the electromagnetic fluctuations at finite temperature. We also derive particle’s equation of motion, the Langevin equation, by minimizing the corresponding stochastic effective action, which is obtained with the method of Feynman-Vernon influence functional. The fluctuation-dissipation theorem is established from first principles. The backreaction on the charge is known in terms of electromagnetic self-force given by a third-order time derivative of the position, leading to the supraohmic dynamics. This self-force can be argued to be insignificant throughout the evolution when the charge barely moves. The stochastic force arising from the supraohmic environment is found to have both positive and negative correlations, and it drives the charge into a fluctuating motion. Although positive force correlations give rise to the growth of the velocity dispersion initially, its growth slows down when correlation turns negative, and finally halts, thus leading to the saturation of the velocity dispersion. The saturation mechanism in a supraohmic environment is found to be distinctly different from that in an ohmic environment. The comparison is discussed. (shrink)

Integrity and research ethics are cherished institutions in academic world. Although most societies have rules and codes that govern ethical conducts in research, few studies have provided quantitative evidence on the impacts of these regulations and codes on the behaviors of researchers. In the context of a nationwide anti-corruption campaign in China, this paper evaluates the changes of principal investigators’ reimbursement behavior in a leading university when new reimbursement policies were introduced. Utilizing a novel grant dataset and a regression discontinuity (...) design, we find that the new policies lowered PIs’ monthly average amount of reimbursement from research grants by 35%, which can be interpreted as a reduction in grant misuse. Following speculations we argue that institutionalizing orchestrated efforts on grant management, payroll systems, and research integrity education is in the right direction toward building China into a true scientific power. (shrink)

The main purpose of this study is to explore and map the intellectual structure of business ethics studies during 1997–2006 by analyzing 85,000 cited references of 3,059 articles from three business ethics related journals in SSCI and SCI databases. In this article, co-citation analysis and social network analysis techniques are used to research intellectual structure of the business ethics literature. We are able to identify the important publications and the influential scholars as well as the correlations among these publications by (...) analyzing citation and co-citation. Three factors emerged in this study are: (1) ethical/unethical decision making, (2) corporate governance and firm performance, and (3) ethical principles and code of conduct. (shrink)

The main purpose of this study is to explore and map the intellectual structure of business ethics studies during 1997–2006 by analyzing 85,000 cited references of 3,059 articles from three business ethics related journals in SSCI and SCI databases. In this article, co-citation analysis and social network analysis techniques are used to research intellectual structure of the business ethics literature. We are able to identify the important publications and the influential scholars as well as the correlations among these publications by (...) analyzing citation and co-citation. Three factors emerged in this study are: (1) ethical/unethical decision making, (2) corporate governance and firm performance, and (3) ethical principles and code of conduct. (shrink)

SummaryNeither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, (...) between the infant and the snail on one hand, and the normal adult person on the other; this difference is discussed here.The difference consists, it is argued, in the having of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and shame. This raises the question how to tell when a creature has propositional attitudes; snails, we may agree, do not, but how about dogs or chimpanzees? The question is not empirical; the question is what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes.It is next contended that language is a necessary concomitant of any of the propositional attitudes. This idea is not new, but there seem to be few arguments in its favor in the literature; one is attempted here.Crucial to the considerations advanced is the idea that belief depends on having the concept of objective truth, and that this comes only with language.RéuméNi un bébé d'une semaine, ni un serpent ne sont des créatures rationnelles. Si le bébé survit assez longtemps, il deviendra probablement rationnel, mais ce n'est pas vrai pour le serpent. Sil'on veut, on peut dire d'emblee du bébé qu'il est une créature rationnelle parce qu'il le deviendra s'il survit ou parce qu'il appartient à une espèce qui possède cette faculté. Quoi qu'on dise, la différence subsiste, en ce qui concerné la rationalité, entre le bébé et le serpent d'une part, la per‐sonne adulte normale de lcar;autre, et c'est cette différence qui sera discutée ici.La différence consiste, selon l'auteur, en une capacityé d'avoir des attitudes propositionnelles telles que la croyance, le désir, l'intention et la honte. Ceci pose la question de savoir quand on peut dire qu'une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles; on peut se mettre d'accord sur le fait que les serpents n'en ont pas, mais qu'en est‐il des chiens et des chimpanzés? La question n'est pas empirique, elle est de savoir quelle donnée empirique va décider si oui ou non une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles.L'auteur prétend que les attitudes propositionnelles s'accompagnent nécessairement du langage. Cette idèe n'est pas nouvelle, mais il semble qu'il y a peu d'arguments qui la soutiennent dans la littérature. On en trouvera un ici, où l'on montre qu'un élément crucial de a croyance dépend de l'acquisition du concept de vérité objective, qui ne se développe qu'avec le langage.ZusammenfassungWeder ein eine Woche altes Kind noch eine Schlange sind rationale Wesen. Wenn das Kind lange genug überlebt, wird es sich wahrscheinlich zu einem vernünftigen Wesen entwickeln, wäh‐rend das für die Schlange nicht zutrifft. Wenn wir wollen, können wir vom Kind sagen, dass es von Anfang an cin rationales Wesen ist, weil es im Fallc des Ubcrlebens vernünftig werden wird oder weil es zu einer Spezies mit dieser Fähigkeit gehört. Wie auch immer wir das ausdrücken, bleibt bezüglich der Rationalität der Unterschied zwischen dem Kind und der Schlange einerseits und der erwachsenen Person andererseits zurück. Dieser Unterschied wird hier diskutiert.Es wird argumentiert, dass der Unterschied in der Fähigkeit besteht, psychologische Haltun‐gen wie Glauben, Begierden, Absichten und Scham zu haben. Damit erhebt sich die Frage, wie man entscheiden kann, wann ein Wesen solchc Einstellungcn hat; Schlangen, wird man zugeben, haben keine; wie steht es aber mit Hunden Oder Schimpansen? Die Frage ist keine empirische, sondern betrifft die Frage, welche Art von empirischen Belegen für den Entscheid relevant ist, ob ein Wesen derartige Einstellungen hat.Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass Sprachen ein notwendiger Begleitumstand einer jeglichen propositionalen Haltung ist. Der Gedanke ist zwar nicht neu, aber es finden sich wenige Argu‐mente zu seiner Stützung in der Literatur; eines wird hier ausgeführt.Entscheidend für die vorgelegten Betrachtungen ist die Auffassung, wonach Glaube vom Begriff der objektiven Wahrheit abhängt, und dieser kommt erst mit der Sprache. (shrink)

SummaryNeither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, (...) between the infant and the snail on one hand, and the normal adult person on the other; this difference is discussed here.The difference consists, it is argued, in the having of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and shame. This raises the question how to tell when a creature has propositional attitudes; snails, we may agree, do not, but how about dogs or chimpanzees? The question is not empirical; the question is what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes.It is next contended that language is a necessary concomitant of any of the propositional attitudes. This idea is not new, but there seem to be few arguments in its favor in the literature; one is attempted here.Crucial to the considerations advanced is the idea that belief depends on having the concept of objective truth, and that this comes only with language.RéuméNi un bébé d'une semaine, ni un serpent ne sont des créatures rationnelles. Si le bébé survit assez longtemps, il deviendra probablement rationnel, mais ce n'est pas vrai pour le serpent. Sil'on veut, on peut dire d'emblee du bébé qu'il est une créature rationnelle parce qu'il le deviendra s'il survit ou parce qu'il appartient à une espèce qui possède cette faculté. Quoi qu'on dise, la différence subsiste, en ce qui concerné la rationalité, entre le bébé et le serpent d'une part, la per‐sonne adulte normale de lcar;autre, et c'est cette différence qui sera discutée ici.La différence consiste, selon l'auteur, en une capacityé d'avoir des attitudes propositionnelles telles que la croyance, le désir, l'intention et la honte. Ceci pose la question de savoir quand on peut dire qu'une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles; on peut se mettre d'accord sur le fait que les serpents n'en ont pas, mais qu'en est‐il des chiens et des chimpanzés? La question n'est pas empirique, elle est de savoir quelle donnée empirique va décider si oui ou non une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles.L'auteur prétend que les attitudes propositionnelles s'accompagnent nécessairement du langage. Cette idèe n'est pas nouvelle, mais il semble qu'il y a peu d'arguments qui la soutiennent dans la littérature. On en trouvera un ici, où l'on montre qu'un élément crucial de a croyance dépend de l'acquisition du concept de vérité objective, qui ne se développe qu'avec le langage.ZusammenfassungWeder ein eine Woche altes Kind noch eine Schlange sind rationale Wesen. Wenn das Kind lange genug überlebt, wird es sich wahrscheinlich zu einem vernünftigen Wesen entwickeln, wäh‐rend das für die Schlange nicht zutrifft. Wenn wir wollen, können wir vom Kind sagen, dass es von Anfang an cin rationales Wesen ist, weil es im Fallc des Ubcrlebens vernünftig werden wird oder weil es zu einer Spezies mit dieser Fähigkeit gehört. Wie auch immer wir das ausdrücken, bleibt bezüglich der Rationalität der Unterschied zwischen dem Kind und der Schlange einerseits und der erwachsenen Person andererseits zurück. Dieser Unterschied wird hier diskutiert.Es wird argumentiert, dass der Unterschied in der Fähigkeit besteht, psychologische Haltun‐gen wie Glauben, Begierden, Absichten und Scham zu haben. Damit erhebt sich die Frage, wie man entscheiden kann, wann ein Wesen solchc Einstellungcn hat; Schlangen, wird man zugeben, haben keine; wie steht es aber mit Hunden Oder Schimpansen? Die Frage ist keine empirische, sondern betrifft die Frage, welche Art von empirischen Belegen für den Entscheid relevant ist, ob ein Wesen derartige Einstellungen hat.Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass Sprachen ein notwendiger Begleitumstand einer jeglichen propositionalen Haltung ist. Der Gedanke ist zwar nicht neu, aber es finden sich wenige Argu‐mente zu seiner Stützung in der Literatur; eines wird hier ausgeführt.Entscheidend für die vorgelegten Betrachtungen ist die Auffassung, wonach Glaube vom Begriff der objektiven Wahrheit abhängt, und dieser kommt erst mit der Sprache. (shrink)

In der neuen Literatur tiber Leibniz' Spatphilosophie findet man zwei deutlich einander entgegengesetzte Theorien Uber die Realitat des Körpers. Auf der einen Seite gibt es Gesichtspunkte, die ihn mit einer Phänomenalismuslehre verbinden, nach welcher die Körper nichts anderes als koordinierte Perzeptionen unausgedehnter Monaden sind. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es Griinde, die dafur sprechen, daß Leibniz die Auffassung vertreten muß, daß Körper Aggregate von Monaden sind. In diesem Aufsatz suche ich zu zeigen, daß die phanomenalistische Interpretation aufgrund der starken Textzeugnisse, (...) die Leibniz beständig zur Aggregatthese hindrängen, zuriickzuweisen ist. Daruber hinaus weise ich jedoch die verbreitete Auffassung eben der Aggregatthese zurück, d. h. die Meinung, gewisse Vielheiten von Monaden riefen bloß die Illusion, Körper zu sein, hervor, wenn sie durch andere Monaden M falsch perzipiert" werden. Gegen diese Auffassung des falschen Perzipierens ftihre ich ins Feld, daß die Aggregatthese als ein Deutungsversuch der Natur oder des Wesens des Körpers verstanden werden mufi. Wenn Leibniz sagt, Körper seien Aggregate von Monaden, so ist das nicht als blofie Behauptung, gewisse Monaden erschienen anderen Monaden als Körper, zu verstehen, sondern als die These, daß jeder Körper seinem Wesen nach eine Vielheit von Monadenist. (shrink)

Desde Descartes a epistemologia tem se baseado no conhecimento de primeira pessoa. Devemos começar, de acordo com a história usual, com o que é mais certo: o conhecimento de nossas próprias sensações e pensamentos. De uma maneira ou outra, progredimos então, se pudermos, para o conhecimento de um mundo externo objetivo. Há por fim uma passagem tênue ao conhecimento das outras mentes. Defendo uma total revisão desse quadro. Todo pensamento proposicional, quer positivo ou cético, sobre o interior ou sobre o (...) exterior, exige a posse do conceito de verdade objetiva, e esse conceito está acessível apenas a criaturas que estão em comunicação com outras. O conhecimento de outras mentes é, assim, básico para todo o pensamento. Mas esse conhecimento exige e supõe o conhecimento de um mundo compartilhado de objetos em um espaço e tempo comuns. Assim, a aquisição do conhecimento não é baseada em uma progressão do subjetivo para o objetivo; ele emerge holisticamente e é interpessoal desde o começo. (shrink)

Zu Arnauld und im Discours de métaphysique sagt Leibniz, daß alle Wahrheiten begrifflich (prädikativ) und manche gleichwohl kontingent sind. Ich untersuche das Problem im Hinblick auf mögliche Wesen, die ich als möglich auch betrachte und versuche nachzuweisen, daß die Position keinen Widerspruch enthält, weil Leibniz zwei Arten begrifflichen Enthaltenseins unterscheidet -logisch und kausal: Die erste ist notwendig, die zweite jedoch kontingent und nur hypothetisch notwendig, notwendig also lediglich unter der Voraussetzung des vorgegebenen freien Willens Gottes. Es gibt insofern auch zwei (...) Arten vollständiger Begriffe - logisch und kausal vollständig: Kausal vollständige Begriffe sind logisch unvollständig und enthalten gleichwohl logisch (hypothetisches Enthaltensein) Gründe für die fehlenden Prädikate. Diese Begriffe sind Begriffe von zeitlichen Zuständen, die in einem Individuum durch Gottes wohlbegründete freie Ratschlüsse verbunden sind - solche Zustände lassen sich zwar separieren, jedoch nicht neu zusammenfügen. Diese Interpretation ist vereinbar mit dem inesse-Prinzip, mit Gottes Wissen um zukünftige zufällige Ereignisse sowie Leibniz' Ablehnung des Konzepts weltübergreifender Identität und kann durch die Einbeziehung des Kontingenz-Kriteriums einer unendlichen Analyse sowie einer Theorie der Gegenstücke zur Erklärung des Kontrafaktischen problemlos erweitert werden. (shrink)

In der Monadologie und in den Meditationes schreibt Leibniz, Descartes' ontologischer Gottesbeweis sei unvollständig. In diesem Aufsatz untersuche ich Leibniz' Bemühen um die Vervollständigung des Beweises. Sein Argument für die Prämisse „Der Gottesbegriff ist ein möglicher Begriff“ ist unverträglich mit einem anderen Stück seiner Metaphysik, und zwar mit seiner Annahme einer Art von Disparata. Leibniz behauptet, der Gottesbegriff sei ein möglicher, d. h. kein inkompatibler Begriff. Er vertritt die These, Gott bestehe aus einfachen Eigenschaften und diese könnten nicht inkompatibel sein, (...) weil einfache Eigenschaften nicht zerlegbar seien. Ich vertrete jedoch die These, daß Leibniz Unverträglichkeiten zwischen einfachen Eigenschaften zuläßt. Diese Art von Unverträglichkeit wird dann betrachtet in Beziehungen zu den Wegen, auf denen wir nach Leibniz Gottes Eigenschaften erkennen können. Es wird gezeigt, daß sein Bemühen, im ontologischen Gottesbeweis nachzuweisen, daß der GottesbegrifF ein möglicher Begriff sei, vergeblich ist. (shrink)

El artículo da cuenta que la historia constitucional chilena se encuentra vinculada a las nociones de orden y estabilidad. Esta situación se manifiesta de manera particular en la Constitución de 1980, fruto del régimen de un gobierno de facto que implantó un sistema constitucional fundado en una comprensión liberal de la democracia, la cual se fundamenta y se legitima por su uso. Se apuesta por una reforma a la Carta, la que actualmente opera fuera de los fines de toda Constitución, (...) restringiendo la participación ciudadana. Particular atención merecen las manifestaciones que tienen lugar hoy y que reflejan cómo el régimen constitucional impide poner sobre la mesa de discusión con el Gobierno un ideal de educación que abandone una democracia instrumental y que recoja principios republicanos. (shrink)

RESUMO Do início até o final de suas publicações, Mikhail Bakhtin escreveu frequentemente a respeito da força da criatividade. Isso foi um tema secundário, mas também uma variante livre e valorativa de seus grandes temas, como dialogismo, cronotopo, carnaval, grande tempo. A definição de Bakhtin que colabora para distinguir o dado, que já existe, do recentemente criado, ajuda-nos, em 2015, a resgatar a criatividade de seus usos desgastados na esfera pública. Uma finalidade deste ensaio é retificar uma expressão valiosa: mostrar (...) o que Bakhtin quer dizer com a cocriatividade daqueles que compreendem1. Outra finalidade é especificar, com o auxílio de Bakhtin, o tipo de criatividade que Alexandr Pushkin realiza nos poemas líricos, narrativos e meditativos em seu momento histórico. Na medida em que formos bem-sucedidos, continuamos um projeto de estudos bakhtinianos cujo objetivo é mostrar como seu pensamento contribui para a interpretação da poesia como uma arte verbal.ABSTRACT From the beginning to the end of his publishing career, Mikhail Bakhtin very often wrote about the force of creativity. This is a secondary theme, but also a freedom-valuing variant of his grand themes of dialogism, chronotope, carnival, great time. Bakhtin's definition, which works to disentangle the existing given from the newly-created, helps us in 2015 to rescue creativity from debased usages in the public sphere. One purpose of this essay is to rectify a valuable term: to show what Bakhtin means by "the co-creativity of those who understand." Another purpose is to specify, with Bakhtin's help, the type of creativity Alexandr Pushkin achieves in his historical moment, in lyric, narrative, and meditative poems. To the extent we are successful, we continue an ongoing project in Bakhtin studies: to show how his thinking aids in the interpretation of poetry as verbal art. (shrink)

Based on their critical analysis of Kant's "Critique of Judgment", the authors of this book show from different perspectives in what way the Kantian concept of the sublime is still a main stream of inspiration for contemporary thinking.

Although Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot both seek to undermine the classical subject of philosophical discourse as embodied in the self-transparent “I think,” their methodologies appear to be worlds apart. In his early work, Merleau-Ponty is engaged in a phenomenological rethinking of subjectivity via an elaboration of Husserl’s “I can,” whereas Blanchot seems to defer all subjectivity in his nomadic exploration of the space between literature, criticism, and theory. Rather than seeking to avoid this tension by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s later work, this (...) paper demonstrates the philosophical significance of reading Blanchot alongside Merleau-Ponty’s early work. This, I argue, reveals the radical nature of Merleau-Ponty’s early account of subjectivity (from the “I can” to the “I speak” to the violence of perception) as well as a certain phenomenological and ethical significance in Blanchot’s readings of the myths of the Sirens and of Orpheus and Eurydice.Bien que Merleau-Ponty et Blanchot cherchent tout deux à ébranler le sujet classique du discours philosophique tel qu’il est incarné dans la transparence à soi du “je pense”, leur méthodologies semblent être très éloignées. Dans ses premiers travaux, Merleau-Ponty s’engage dans une reformulation phénoménologique de la subjectivité à travers une élaboration du “je peux” husserlien, tandis que Blanchot paraît reporter toute subjectivité dans son exploration nomade de l’espace, entre littérature, critique et théorie. Plutôt que d’échapper à cette tension en se concentrant sur les travaux tardifs de Merleau-Ponty, cet article vise à montrer l’intérêt d’une lecture de Blanchot au fil des premiers travaux de Merleau-Ponty. Cela révèle la nature radicale des premières considérations de Merleau-Ponty sur la subjectivité (du “je peux” au “je parle”, jusqu’à la violence de la perception), tout autant qu’une certaine signification phénoménologique et éthique de la lecture par Blanchot du mythe des Sirênes, ou de celui d’Orphée et Eurydice. Nonostante Merleau-Ponty e Blanchot cerchino entrambi di minare il soggetto classico del discorso filosofico, incarnato da un “io penso” trasparente a se stesso, le loro rispettive metodologie appaiono diametralmente opposte. Nei suoi primi scritti, Merleau-Ponty è impegnato in un ripensamento fenomenologico della soggettività attraverso una rielaborazione dell’“io posso” di Husserl, mentre Blanchot sembra rinviare l’intera sfera della soggettività alla sua esplorazione nomadica dello spazio tra letteratura, critica e teoria. Anziché cercare di aggirare questa tensione concentrandosi sugli scritti più tardi di Merleau-Ponty, questo articolo mette in luce la rilevanza filosofica di una lettura di Blanchot condotta a fianco dei primi scritti di Merleau-Ponty. Come intendo sostenere, questo rivela la natura radicale delle prime considerazioni di Merleau-Ponty sulla soggettività (dall’“io posso” all’“io parlo” alla violenza della percezione) e al contempo un significato fenomenologico ed etico della lettura di Blanchot del mito delle Sirene e di quello di Orfeo ed Euridice. (shrink)

Abstract In an important text, A Thousand Teachings, sometimes overlooked by scholars, Sankara expounds non?dualist religion. This article analyses Sankara's thought for its theoretical and practical perspectives. First, the discussion views non?duality from the viewpoint of ignorance. This pluralistic/dualistic perspective obscures the unenlightened seeker's vision of the Ultimate Truth. Secondly, the study examines Sankara's introduction of a transitional idea, Unevolved Name?and?Form (avy?krte n?mar?pe). Such an idea assists the seeker's intellectual progress from the state of ignorance to a rational understanding leading (...) toward nonduality (Advaita Ved?nta). Finally, the exposition clarifies Sankara's expression of the ?knowledge of Brahman?. This fulfilling wisdom affects a transformation of the life experience of the unenlightened. Subsequently disciplined in meditation (parisamkhy?na), the persistent seeker develops into an experiencer of the non?duality (advaitav?da). (shrink)

The small section of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes called “Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug oder die Sache selbst” is one stage of the total dialectical movement of Hegel’s “Science of the Experience of Consciousness.” It plays a role like any other stage, as a form of appearance through which consciousness must pass on its way to “absolute knowing.” Some stages of Hegel’s Phänomenologie have tended to acquire a status for its readers beyond the function they serve in the total (...) movement of consciousness. This has certainly been true of the famous “Master and Servant” relationship and to a lesser extent of the “Unhappy Consciousness,” the “Beautiful Soul,” and that part of “Force and Understanding” called the “inverted” or “topsy-turvy world,” to name a few. (shrink)

El artículo da cuenta que la historia constitucional chilena se encuentra vinculada a las nociones de orden y estabilidad. Esta situación se manifiesta de manera particular en la Constitución de 1980, fruto del régimen de un gobierno de facto que implantó un sistema constitucional fundado en una comprensión liberal de la democracia, la cual se fundamenta y se legitima por su uso. Se apuesta por una reforma a la Carta, la que actualmente opera fuera de los fines de toda Constitución, (...) restringiendo la participación ciudadana. Particular atención merecen las manifestaciones que tienen lugar hoy y que reflejan cómo el régimen constitucional impide poner sobre la mesa de discusión con el Gobierno un ideal de educación que abandone una democracia instrumental y que recoja principios republicanos. (shrink)

"De nos jours, la justice est omniprésente dans l’espace public. Elle nous interpelle sous diverses formes?: faits divers, procès qui enflamment l’opinion publique, jugements qui affectent la vie des citoyens ou qui changent le paysage institutionnel dans lequel nous évoluons, etc. En fait, la médiatisation de la justice joue depuis longtemps un rôle essentiel dans le débat public, la régulation sociale ou le jeu politique en Occident. En une vingtaine d’études, plusieurs facettes du lien entre justice et espaces publics (...) sont explorées, de la fin du Moyen Âge jusqu’au siècle dernier, en Europe comme au Canada?: usages politiques de la justice, enjeux sociaux révélés par l’intervention judiciaire, échos médiatiques du palais et mobilisation de l’opinion publique, rôle de la presse dans les représentations du crime et des criminels, critiques du pouvoir judiciaire et des forces policières. Cet ouvrage collectif montre à quel point l’institution judiciaire a contribué à la construction de l’espace public au fil de ses transformations séculaires, combien aussi la justice ne se conçoit qu’à travers les lieux du vivre-ensemble et les différentes expressions de l’opinion publique. Le lecteur est donc convié à suivre le fil d’une vaste interrogation sur la place que la justice a historiquement occupée dans la formation de la conscience publique des sociétés occidentales." Présentation de l'éditeur. (shrink)

Hegelians and those scholars concerned with the history of idealism owe Lawrence Stepelevich a vote of thanks for this useful, clearly presented collection of texts from the Young Hegelian philosophers who extended Hegel’s philosophy according to their own lights in the first two decades following Hegel’s death. Hegel died in 1831. Stepelevich understands Young Hegelianism as an identifiable philosophical movement to have existed from 1830 to 1848. It begins with Feuerbach’s work, Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit of 1830, and finds (...) its last real expression in Karl Schmidt’s Das Verstandestum und das Individuum in 1846. In addition to selections from these two figures, the volume contains selections from the works of Strauss, von Cieszkowski, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Ruge, Engels, Marx, Stirner, and Hess. Much of the work presented appears for the first time in English translation, and the volume itself is the first English language text devoted to the writings of this movement. Although most Hegelian scholars know German, and thus these texts are available to them in the original, it is a great advantage to have such texts available in competent translations. Hegel himself recognized this in his well-known letter to Voss of May 1805, where he compares translations into a people’s own language to a gift and expresses his wish to have philosophy speak German. (shrink)

Hegelians and those scholars concerned with the history of idealism owe Lawrence Stepelevich a vote of thanks for this useful, clearly presented collection of texts from the Young Hegelian philosophers who extended Hegel’s philosophy according to their own lights in the first two decades following Hegel’s death. Hegel died in 1831. Stepelevich understands Young Hegelianism as an identifiable philosophical movement to have existed from 1830 to 1848. It begins with Feuerbach’s work, Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit of 1830, and finds (...) its last real expression in Karl Schmidt’s Das Verstandestum und das Individuum in 1846. In addition to selections from these two figures, the volume contains selections from the works of Strauss, von Cieszkowski, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Ruge, Engels, Marx, Stirner, and Hess. Much of the work presented appears for the first time in English translation, and the volume itself is the first English language text devoted to the writings of this movement. Although most Hegelian scholars know German, and thus these texts are available to them in the original, it is a great advantage to have such texts available in competent translations. Hegel himself recognized this in his well-known letter to Voss of May 1805, where he compares translations into a people’s own language to a gift and expresses his wish to have philosophy speak German. (shrink)

Résumé Le présent article décortique, avec une approche sémiotique, l’index que l’on retrouve à la fin d’un livre. L’objectif est double : faire ressortir les processus de signification en jeu dans l’index et reconnaître la création sémiotique réalisée par l’analyste documentaire. L’index est un assemblage de signes, soit les vedettes, les localisateurs ainsi que diverses caractéristiques de la représentation spatiale ; leur signifiant renvoie à leur signifié respectif. L’index dans sa totalité représente un texte sémiotique, d’un genre spécifique, et dont (...) l’interprétation repose non seulement sur les expressions linguistiques elles-mêmes, mais aussi sur la structure des entrées et sur les liens tissés avec les passages de l’ouvrage indexé. L’index peut paraître une structure objective, proposant une version épurée et stable du contenu d’un document. Or, l’analyse sémiotique proposée ici révélera d’une part la structure malléable de l’index et d’autre part l’interprétation flexible et la subjectivité injectées dans sa construction. Après une description plus approfondie du contexte et de la problématique, nous décrivons d’abord l’aspect formel de l’index, soit les signes impliqués et la manière dont ils sont agencés. Nous abordons ensuite l’aspect interprétatif de l’index, notamment les facteurs qui influencent son interprétation. Ceci nous amène à décrire en détail la structure logique de l’index. Cet exercice un peu scolaire d’un outil qui peut sembler familier permettra de mettre en lumière des jeux de signification normalement passés sous silence. (shrink)

L'auteur part de la définition la plus intuitive du concept de neutralité pour présenter quatre thèses qui se sont révélées comme des acquis du débat. Ces thèses affirment : 1) que la neutralité est un concept politique et non pas moral ; 2) qu'elle vise les justifications de l'action de l'État et non pas ses conséquences ; 3) qu'elle n'oblige pas nécessairement l'État à s'abstenir d'agir ; et 4) qu'elle est avant tout neutralité envers les individus et seulement de manière (...) dérivée neutralité envers les conceptions du bien. Ensuite, l'auteur discute deux affirmations qui jouissent d'une popularité aussi forte que les précédentes mais qui sont beaucoup moins évidentes. La première est qu'il y a des liens profonds entre l'idée de neutralité et l'idée d'égalité. La deuxième est qu'il y a un rapport d'équivalence entre le concept de neutralité et celui d'anti-perfectionnisme. Mettre en question cette dernière affirmation implique une prise de distance par rapport à quelques argumentations bien connues en faveur de la neutralité, mais cette opération s'impose si on veut répondre aux critiques de ceux qui proposent l'abandon de cette exigence normative.The article presents four theses that can be seen as firm outcomes of the contemporary debate on the principle of neutrality. These theses affirm that 1) neutrality is a political concept, not a moral one ; 2) neutrality involves the justifications of the State's action, not its consequences ; 3) neutrality does not imply State's inactivity ; and 4) State's neutrality is before anything neutrality between individuals and it is only afterwards between conceptions of the good. The second part of the article discusses two widely accepted but far more controversial statements. The first one says that there are deep links between neutrality and equality. The second one ajfirms that neutrality and anti-perfectionism are equivalent. To challenge the latter implies to reject some of the most popular cases for neutrality. However, this is needed if one wants to react to the great criticism coming from enemies of this principle. (shrink)

This paper explores some parallels between the concept of action as it is deployed in two theoretical projects: constructing a virtue-ethical account of right action; and explaining human actions in causal terms. Although one project is normative and the other non-normative, I argue that they face essentially the same fundamental challenge: both have a difficult time dealing with the familiar fact that persons have the ability to act out of character. For virtue ethics, this fact threatens to undermine its most (...) distinctive account of what makes an action right, one that grounds rightness in virtuous character. For causal theories of action, it makes trouble for the idea that all human actions can be explained adequately within an event-causal framework. (shrink)

L’idea che vi sia una netta dicotomia tra fatti e valori è uno dei dogmi dell’empirismo. Secondo questa concezione, i giudizi fattuali, in quanto verificabili o falsificabili empiricamente, riguardano le aree di razionalità «pura» e omogenea e sono ancorati naturalisticamente al mondo. Gli enunciati di valore, invece, sarebbero da relegare nella sfera di ciò che è semplicemente «soggettivo», emotivo, irrazionale. Questo assunto, che ha dominato per molto tempo le scienze e la filosofia, è stato messo in dubbio dai pragmatisti e (...) da alcuni dei più influenti pensatori contemporanei, che, intervenendo al dibattito sull’oggettività dell’etica, hanno mostrato come la presunta eterogeneità tra giudizi descrittivi e giudizi valutativi sia ormai insostenibile. Sulla scia della prospettiva inaugurata da questi pensatori, gli autori di questo libro mostrano come la dicotomia fatto/valore abbia corrotto il nostro pensiero, impedendoci di rivolgere l’attenzione alle intersezioni, le sinergie e le relazioni che esistono tra processi cognitivi e coefficienti valutativi, tra scienza e etica. Con saggi di S. Clough, D. Copp, D. Davidson, G. Marchetti, H. Putnam, R. A. Putnam B. Stroud, K. A. Taylor, V. Walsh. (shrink)

We present a one per cent measurement of the cosmic distance scale from the detections of the baryon acoustic oscillations in the clustering of galaxies from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey, which is part of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey III. Our results come from the Data Release 11 sample, containing nearly one million galaxies and covering approximately 8500 square degrees and the redshift range 0.2 < z < 0.7. We also compare these results with those from the publicly released (...) DR9 and DR10 samples. Assuming a concordance Λ cold dark matter cosmological model, the DR11 sample covers a volume of 13 Gpc3 and is the largest region of the Universe ever surveyed at this density. We measure the correlation function and power spectrum, including density-field reconstruction of the BAO feature. The acoustic features are detected at a significance of over 7σ in both the correlation function and power spectrum. Fitting for the position of the acoustic features measures the distance relative to the sound horizon at the drag epoch, rd, which has a value of rd,fid = 149.28 Mpc in our fiducial cosmology. We find DV = at z = 0.32 and DV = at z = 0.57. At 1.0 per cent, this latter measure is the most precise distance constraint ever obtained from a galaxy survey. Separating the clustering along and transverse to the line of sight yields measurements at z = 0.57 of DA = and H =. Our measurements of the distance scale are in good agreement with previous BAO measurements and with the predictions from cosmic microwave background data for a spatially flat CDM model with a cosmological constant. © 2014 The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. (shrink)

Die Unvollkommenheit des Menschen zwingt ihn biologisch zu Kompensationen, die in den kulturellen Leistungen zum Ausdruck kommen. Psychologisch bedeutet diese Unvollkommenheit eine Offenheit hinsichtlich einer unendlichen Vielfalt schöpferischer Möglichkeiten. Während Alfred Adlers Überlegungen auf den Finalismus einer idealen Gemeinschaft als die noch zu vollendende Evolution zielen, stellen Sigmund Freud und Donald W. Winnicott die Unabschließbarkeit seelischer Entwicklungen heraus. Die Unvollkommenheit des Seelischen kann sich in alle Richtungen entfalten, muss aber dabei immer mit den unvermeidlichen Konsequenzen rechnen. Das Umgehen mit (...) unserer Unvollkommenheit kann durchaus misslingen und führt zu Abwehrmaßnahmen, durch die die Menschen gottähnlich werden wollen. (shrink)

This paper aims to articulate the theories of Martin Buber (Philosophical Anthropology) and Donald Wood Winnicott (Psychoanalysis) as they help us understand the world of infancy. In dialogue with these two authors, we come to understand that the ontological principle of the human being is the relationship as a mark of existence. Based on this principle, the concepts “relationship,” “subtlety,” “reciprocity” and “bond” are introduced in order to explore the relational dimension of the interactions between infants and adults in (...) both educational and research contexts. Our text develops these four concepts and explores the part they play in the encounter between adults and infants, on the understanding that the latter is based on the effort to recognize each other as persons. We argue that for adults, the fundamental impulse toward infancy is to share the world through inviting their participation–an invitation in response to which babies launch themselves with the tenacity and impetus of an inaugural movement. The theoretical confluence of Winnicott's psychoanalysis and Buber's philosophical anthropology results in confirming that infants are intrinsically relational persons, and as such, these two thinkers’ relational ontology has much to contribute to studies in infant education in particular and in the Human Sciences in general. (shrink)

De acordo com a interpretação mais comum na literatura filosófica, Donald Davidson – que celebremente afirmou que “uma criatura não pode ter pensamentos a menos que tenha uma linguagem” – nega que criaturas não linguísticas são criaturas pensantes. No entanto, neste artigo argumento que esta interpretação é errada. Analisando atentamente os argumentos de Davidson, procuro mostrar que ele não está a argumentar que criaturas não linguísticas não podem possuir pensamentos; em vez disso, defendo que ele está simplesmente a afirmar (...) que na ausência de linguagem as atribuições de pensamento não podem ser vistas como mais do que meras ficções úteis que permitem explicar com êxito o comportamento daquelas criaturas. (shrink)

Capítulo 9 do livro de Donald Davidson Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford University Press, 2001. Tradução de Helder Buenos Aires de Carvalho, realizada originalmente para o Portal Brasileiro da Filosofia/CEFA.